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ABSTRACT 
 
Amrani Joutei, Sliman. MODELING AND ANALYSIS OF CASCADING EFFECTS 
OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) EVENTS ON CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS. (Major Professor: Marwan Bikdash), North 
Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University.  
 
This research studies how the global network behaves after a Weapon of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) attack. The goal is to find a reliable model that will help capture the 
behavior of the network in the event of a WMD attack and then proceed to a systematic 
analysis of that model. We discuss a hierarchical model that visualizes how a WMD 
attack will impact different infrastructure systems. The second level of the Hierarchical 
Fault Model (HFM) illustrates the failure propagation from one Critical Infrastructure 
System (CIS) to another CIS. Next, we construct a stochastic Petri Net for HFM of which 
we compute a Markov model representation that is subsequently developed and analyzed. 
In the developed models, both the repair and the failure are modeled to be random, 
and the repair process for one system depends on the actual system as well as on the 
damage severity in the other systems as well. For example, if the repair process of the 
Information System requires one day normally, the repair process will be further delayed 
by damages in the Transportation System or in the Hospital System. 
We develop algorithms and methods that allow the analysis of different aspects of 
the HFM such as understanding state trajectory dynamics and the statistics of the 
transient and steady-state behavior. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 WMD attacks and other threats under investigation 
The south tower of the world trade center in New York City was slammed by a 
plane at 9:03 AM, and at 9:21 AM another plane hit the North tower. Additionally, more 
attacks were carried out in Washington DC and New Pittsburg. This act left 2819 dead 
[1]. The rescue mission was impaired by secondary damages. For instance, the 
Emergency Operation Center, a $15 million facility opened in 1999 and located in the 
23d floor of the World Trade Center building was also destroyed [1]. In this particular 
case, terrorists used knives to hijack planes but what if the terrorists decide to use more 
sophisticated weapons in order to conduct and carry out their operations? What if 
terrorists used chemical or biological weapons?  
Terror events are not equal, therefore they should be classified. Furthermore, 
terrorist acts can be modeled as consisting of successive steps. The probability of a 
terrorist event is in fact the product of the conditional probabilities associated with the 
steps. Hence, in order to reduce the probability of terror events, we should aim at 
reducing conditional probabilities to the minimum [2]. 
 An example of terrorist attacks could be a cyber attack, which can be described as 
security failures (as opposed to reliability failures). Security failures are often by 
reliability failures [3]. An example is that of a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) 
attack when a group of synchronized requests to a resource are sent to a network. The 
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goal of the attack is to prevent legitimate users access the resources and to push the 
system to the brink of reliability failures.  The simulation tools that can detect a cascading 
failure independently of security failure must be developed [4]. 
The entire natural resources can be thought of as linked together through "Cyber 
care", thus leading to a superior response to a terrorist attack [5]. Attacks may also be 
decentralized on integrated networks [6]. 
The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is in the process of becoming an all hazard 
WMD technology evaluation and training range. The benefits of consolidating all types 
of training related to WMD in one facility are apparent [7].  
To increase the efficiency of a WMD attack response, an integrated Hierarchical 
Fault Model (HFM) such the one considered in this thesis is greatly beneficial. The 
modeling effort is complemented by designing sophisticated alarm systems to combat 
terrorism.  A micromachined differential mobility spectrometer (DMS), for instance can 
detect chemical and biological agents simultaneously on a time scale of seconds [8].  
A full model may also have to include government policies such as those 
enforcing antiterrorist regulations recommendations such as Biological Weapon 
Convention (BWC) and Chemical Weapon Convention (CWC) [9].   
One substructure of the network is the transportation network. Terrorists may use 
the trucking network to conduct an attack or try to destroy parts of it. Many command 
and control security systems can be used to prevent such attacks, such as, the use of GPS 
technology [10]. 
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 Another substructure of interest is the communication network. Its survivability 
is assessed using simulations and analytical model [11]. Although WMD deals primarily 
with the physical destruction of the network units, intrusion is possible after a WMD 
event to further weaken the network. 
 Network intrusion can be detected by using Markov Chains and the flag field in 
TCP/IP protocol [12]. 
One measure of the survivability counts the number of connected nodes in the 
largest communicating section of the network after attack. Algorithms are available to 
identify vulnerable nodes in the network [13]. Some nodes are more central than others 
and hence are crucial to survivability [14].  
Survivability can also be defined as the ability of the system to meet the minimum 
performance in the presence of undesirable events. Stochastic reward net and continuous 
Markov chains can be used to model the network survivability [15].  
1.2 Petri Nets 
Adam Petri introduced Petri Nets in 1962. Petri Nets are not only a graphical 
representation of dynamic systems but also a mathematical interpretation. This 
combination made Petri Nets successful in many different applications. For example, 
communication systems and survivability are few areas among many that benefited a lot 
from Petri Nets [16].  
A Petri Net consists of 3 objects: places, transitions, and directed arcs. A Petri Net 
marking denotes the number of tokens in each place.  Transitions and arcs dictate how the 
distributions of the tokens evolve over time [17]. 
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The flow of tokens and their distribution over the places is governed by two rules. 
First, the enabling rule in which a transition is enabled if it contains at least k tokens 
where  k is the multiplicity of the directed arc connecting  a place P to a transition T. 
Second, the firing rule in which a number of k tokens equal to the multiplicity of the 
directed arc TP are deposited in the output places [18]. 
Transient analysis for prioritized failure recovery in communication network was 
studied using Petri Nets. However, the focus was on the transient behavior of a queuing 
system with prioritized recovery [19]. 
Petri nets were also used to assess the survivability of object oriented software in 
design phase [20]. The distribution functions were defined to be the probability for the 
transition to be a failure. The coverage testing and fault density analysis were used to 
compute those distributions. 
Formal verification of a network survivability model was also presented using 
Petri Nets [21] where formal verification enabled the extraction of certain properties like 
reachability, boundedness, and fairness. 
The firing times can be stochastic, thus leading to Stochastic Petri Nets (STPN) 
where the exponential distribution is often used. The STPN can often be simplified to 
Continuous-Time Markov Chains (CTMC). If the resulting Markov chain is ergodic, the 
steady state probability could readily be obtained by using standard linear algebra 
techniques [22]. 
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1.3 Markov Chains 
Andrei A. Markov (1856-1922) proposed the concept of Markov Chains. Since its 
creation, Markov Chains found many applications as survivability and statistical models 
of real-world processes. Markov models have been used to study queuing systems with 
propagated breakdowns and thus survivability analysis was provided. In fact, the system 
returns to the normal state via the threshold in the queue length [23]. 
A survivability quantitative evaluation model was created based on Markov 
models, and was used to develop a methodology for choosing proper strategies and 
optimization of the system design [24]. 
Markov models were also used to evaluate the survivability for intrusion-tolerant 
real-time database systems (ITRDB) [25] and to predict with high accuracy the behavior 
of a real intrusion-tolerant database system. Experimental results show the validity of the 
model used [26]. 
In Markov Chains, the state space of possible values of the Markov Chain is finite 
or countable. Moreover, all the information needed to predict the future is contained in 
the present. At equally- spaced time points, the process evolves from one state to another 
and the one step transition matrix contains the probabilities of transitioning among the 
Markov states [27]. When the states are hidden and observations are generated according 
to some random rule, Hidden Markov models are used. They can represent complex 
Markov processes where the states emit the observations. More information could be 
found in [28]. 
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For a continuous time Markov Chains, a system in state O, can transition after a 
random time with an exponential distribution of parameter λ to another state. When a 
state has more than one state to transition to, the waiting time is exponentially distributed 
with parameter
1 2 ... n     . The probability to jump to a particular state is therefore 
simply the proportion of that rate [27]. 
1.4 Synopsis 
Critical Infrastructure systems (CIS) contain many infrastructure systems (e.g., 
Military, financial, transportation, health, etc.). When a Weapon of Mass Destruction 
(e.g. dirty terrorist bombs, massive nuclear explosion, etc.) affects one or many 
infrastructure systems, the rest of the CIS will be likely affected as well. For example: if a 
WMD destroys a power grid, then the process of repair of the power grid will be 
impaired or delayed because many processes (i.e. Information, Transportation… etc.) 
depends on the power grid. 
In this work, we limit our attention to three systems; namely, the Information 
System (IS), the Transportation System (TS), and the Health System (HS). The WMD 
may damage the different sub-networks differently, It might destroy the IS, TS, and HS 
by 30%-25%-40% respectively. A nuclear bomb attack might destroy the IS, TS, and HS 
by 30%-70%-10% respectively. 
 In chapter 2, we review some of the background necessary to understand this 
research. In chapter 3, we explore the Markov Model Representation of Petri Nets. In 
chapter 4, a Hierarchical Fault Model (HFM) for Weapon of Mass Destruction is 
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constructed. In chapter 5, the HFM is subjected to various analyses, such as extensive 
Monte Carlo simulations, and deriving a representative Markov Model (MM) which is 
subsequently analyzed and develop the methodology and algorithms needed. We 
conclude in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 2   
BACKGROUND 
 
2.1 Petri Nets review 
Petri nets are primarily used for studying the concurrent dynamic behavior of 
network-based systems where there is a discrete flow represented by a number of tokens. 
A Petri net is a bipartite directed graph formed by three types of objects: transitions, 
places, and directed arcs. Directed arcs connect either places to transitions or transitions 
to places. A Petri net consists of two types of nodes: places and transitions. An arc exists 
only from a place to a transition or from a transition to a place. A place may have zero or 
more tokens. Graphically, places, transitions, arcs, and tokens are represented 
respectively by circles, bars, arrows, and dots respectively.     
Figure 2.1 is an example of a Petri net with two places and one transaction. The 
transition node is ready to fire if and only if there is at least one token at each of its input 
places. As shown in Figure 2.1, the Petri Net has one token in the input place P₁. The 
place P₂ receives one token after transition T₁ fires. Figure 2.2 represents the resulting 
Petri Net after T₁ fires. The Petri Nets shown in Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 can be 
represented by the markings  [1,0] and [0,1] . Therefore, the marking transition has the 
form    1,0 0,1 .   
 9 
 
Figure 2.1. A Petri Net with one enabled transition, two places and one token 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Place P₁ looses one token and Place P₂ wins one token 
 
Mathematically we write ( , , , )C P T I O  defined with the following sets and 
mappings. 
 
1 1 1
1 1 1
Places:          { , , ,.... }.
Transitions:  { , , ,... }.
Input:           : ( number of places).
Output:        O : ( number of places).
Marking      : assignment of tokens into pl
n
n
r
q
P p p p p
T t t t t
I T P r
T P q



 
 
1 2 3
aces.
Marking      : = , , ,....... .n     
 (2.1) 
 
The simulation of a stochastic Petri Net follows a simple scheme. In the case of one 
unique transition, the transition will fire if: 
 1 exp( ) ( ),t P X t    rand  (2.2) 
Here rand is a random number  0 1 ,  generated from a uniform distribution. 
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In the case of many transitions, one transition will fire if: 
 
1 2 31 exp( ( .... ) ).n t         rand  (2.3) 
But any transition i  will fire if    
 1 2
rand .
...

  

  
i
n
     
2.1.1 Synchronization, Concurrency, and Conflict in Petri Nets 
In Figure 2.3 transition 
2T  can fire only after the firing of 1T . This imposes the 
precedence of constraints "
2T  after 1T ". With this property, a Petri net is able to model 
processes executing sequentially in time.  
 
Figure 2.3. Example of sequential execution: T₂ fires only when T₁ has already fired 
 
 
In Figure 2.4 transition 
1T  will be enabled only when there are at least one token 
at each of its input places. With this property, a Petri net is able to model multiple 
processes executing with synchronization in time.  
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Figure 2.4. Synchronization example: Place P1 cannot fire until P2 receives a token 
 
 
In Figure 2.5 merging happens when tokens from several places arrive for service 
at the same transition. When transition 
1T  fires, the resources located in the p1aces 1P  and 
2P  are consolidated into the place 3P . 
 
 
Figure 2.5. Example of merging proprieties 
 
Two transitions are concurrent if they can happen simultaneously. In Figure 2.6 
the Transitions 
3T  and 2T  are concurrent. In fact, the Transitions 3T  and 2T  
can happen 
simultaneously (or not). Note that a token in place 
2P  has been duplicated into 2 tokens, 
one in 
2P  
and the other in
3P . 
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Figure 2.6. Example of concurrent transitions 
 
 
Conflict occurs when two transitions 
1T  and 2T  are both ready to fire but the 
firing of one transition leads to the inhibition of the other transition. In Figure 2.7, the 
transition 
1T  cannot fire if the transition 2T  fires. Similarly, the transitions 2T  cannot fire 
if the transition 
1T  fires. 
 
Figure 2.7. Example of a conflict 
 
2.1.2 Stochastic Petri Nets 
The continuous-time Stochastic Petri net ( , )SPN PN   is formed from the Place-
Transition net 
0( , , , , )PN P T I I M  by adding the set of rates 1 2 3( , , ,.. )m     to the 
definition. 
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In [29], conflicts and fairness in Petri Nets were studied. There are many issues 
involved such as detecting conflicts, and determining whether a given Petri Net is prone 
to conflicts. In this thesis, we will use the method outlined in Figure 2.8 to resolve 
conflicts: 
 
 
Figure 2.8. Conflict resolution pseudo-code 
 
  
 
 
Conflict resolution Pseudo code  
Input: The incidence matrix and the initial marking 
If several n transitions are competing for the tokens at a place  over sampling period TS, do as 
follows:  
1. Generate r1 = Uniform [0, 1]. Compare r1 with Pr(<1 transition), Pr(<2 transitions), etc.. 
Determine the largest number m1 of transitions allowed at this period 
2. Generate a random permutation using MATLAB randperm of  1,  2 n , say 
 3 2 5 4 1 . This is the order in which transitions will be checked for being enabled. 
3. Check whether the transitions are enabled in the order in 2, fire them with the underlying 
probability, then remove the tokens. 
a) Generate r2 from uniform [0, 1] and check if r2< lambda (3)/ (sum lambdas). 
If yes, fire T3 and remove the necessary tokens. Keep doing this (proceeding to 
T2, T5, etc.) until 
i. We get more than the number of transitions m1 allowed in 1 
ii. We run out of tokens 
Note: you can cycle through [3 2 5 4 1] until a or b occurs 
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2.2 Markov chains 
2.2.1 Discrete-Time Markov Chains (DTMC) 
The state of a Markov chain at time t is denoted
tX . The state space S of a 
Markov chain is the set of values that 
tX  can take. For example,   0,  1,  2,  3S  is a 
state space.  
The Markov property of a Markov chain is that only the most recent point in the 
trajectory affects the future. Mathematically, the Markov property for all times t  and 
states s  could be stated as follow:  
 
1 0 0 1 1 1( | , ,..., ) ( | ).t t t t t tP X s X s X s X s P X s X s         (2.4) 
The one-step state transition matrix P  for the Markov model has the elements 
   
 
1( | ) for  , S and 0,1,2,..ij t tP P X j X i i j t      (2.5) 
The t th step transition matrix has elements 
 0( | ) ( ) .  
t
t ijP X j X i P  (2.6) 
 
Note that a probability transition matrix is irreducible if the state space is a single 
communicating class.  
Typically, the initial probability distribution of 
0X  is denoted (0) . 
 
 
0(  ) (0).iP X i    (2.7) 
And the probability distribution of 
tX   at time t  with initial distribution  is given by: 
 ( ) ( ).t iP X t  (2.8) 
Equilibrium is obtained when there is no change in the distribution: 
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 . T TP  (2.9) 
2.2.2 Continuous-time Markov chains (CTMC) 
Let  ( ),  0Z t t represent a homogenous finite-state continuous time Markov chain with 
state space   . Let 
ij  represent the random variable time for a transition from state i  to 
state j . We assume that 
ij  is exponentially distributed with parameter ijr . The matrix 
ijr     
is called the rate matrix. Note that for all i  we have 0iir  . From the rate matrix, 
one defines the infinitesimal generator Q matrix as follows: 
 
   if  ij ij
ii ij
j i
q r i j
q r

 


 


 (2.10) 
The infinitesimal generator of a stochastic process contains a lot of information 
about the process. The unconditional probability of the CTMC being in state i  at time t  
is: 
 ( ) ( ( ) ).  i t P Z t i  (2.11) 
The transient state probability vector of the CTMC is 
 
 
1 2 3( ) [ ( ), ( ), ( ),...].   t t t t  (2.12) 
The behavior of the CTMC can be described by the following Kolmogorov 
differential equation: 
 
( )
( ) ,
d t
t Q
dt

  (2.13) 
Whose solution is  
 16 
( ) (0) Qtt e   
 
where the matrix Q  is the infinitesimal generator; additionally, the steady state 
probabilities can be computed by: 
 0,  1.   iQ  (2.14) 
The vector e   is the left eigenvector of the matrix Q  corresponding to the zero 
eigenvalue. The probability distribution is normalized (i.e. 1  i ). More information 
could be found in [30]. 
The one step transition matrix P  of the discrete time Markov Chain equivalent to 
a continuous time Markov Chain with rate matrix R  and infinitesimal generator Q  is: 
 S
QT
P e  (2.15) 
where 
ST  is the sampling time. If ST  is small then: 
 
 
...
2!
SQT S
S S
QT
e I QT I QT       (2.16) 
Combining the above two equations we get 
.
S
P I
Q
T


 
Thus, the matrix Q  can be computed using the one step transition matrix and the time. 
2.3 Hidden Markov Chains 
In the Markov models the states are visible. In hidden Markov Chains the states 
are visible only through a random emission process, in the sense that observations can be 
non trivial functions of the states. Consider the Markov process in Figure 2.9 where 
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0 1 2 3X X X X  is the Markov process and 0 1 2 3O OO O  are the observations. The matrix A  is 
the transition matrix; the matrix B  is the observation matrix which contains the state 
distribution of the observations given a Markov process X . The vector   is the initial 
Markov state distribution. Consider the example in which we have a system that has two 
states and three observations.  
 
Figure 2.9. Hidden Markov Model (HMM) example 
 
 
We wish to know the probability of a state sequence of length four: 
 
 
0 1 2 3( , , , ).X x x x x  (2.17) 
Given the observations: 
 
   0 1 2 3
.7 .3 .1 .4 .5
,  ,  .5 .5 , and ( , , , ).
.2 .8 .7 .2 .1

   
      
   
A B O o o o o  (2.18) 
Therefore: 
 
0 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 30 , 1 , 2 , 3
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ). x x x x x x x x x x xP X b o a b o a b o a b o  (2.19) 
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where O  and X are given. Therefore, it seems that if we are given an observation it is 
possible to get the transition matrix. The MatLab command  
m m e s t i m a t eh  
 is able to 
estimate the transition matrix A  and the observation matrix B  given a collection of 
observations. 
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CHAPTER 3   
MARKOV MODEL REPRESENTATION OF PETRI NETS 
 
3.1 A motivating example 
Figure 3.1 is a simple model of the network. When a WMD attack strikes the 
network (transition 
1T  is in play), the working units in place 1P  go through a failure 
transition to become failed units in place
2P . Some failed units undertake repair transition 
3T  to become working units again. However, other units stay failed units because of the 
failure propagation and go through transition 
2T  to place 3P ; from there they can be 
repaired through transition 
4T  to become working units again.  
 
Figure 3.1. The simple model snapshot from Snoopy 2.0 
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The elements of the pre-incidence matrix are ( )ijD = multiplicity of the arc 
connecting place j  to the input of transition i , and it is zero otherwise. 
The pre-incidence matrix D  and the post-incidence matrix D  are m n  
matrices with m is the number of transitions and n  is the number of places. The matrix 
D  is simply the difference between the matrix D  and the matrix D : 
 D D D    (3.1) 
For example, for the transition 
1T  there is only one input place  1P   with multiplicity one. 
Then (1,1) 1D   but    1,2 1,3 0D D   , and so forth. The resulting matrix is 
therefore: 
 
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
D
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (3.2) 
 
In order to find D , we look to each transition output places and we report the 
multiplicity of that place to the corresponding transition in the post-incidence matrix. For 
example, for the transition 
1T  there is only one output place 2P  with the multiplicity one 
then (1,2) 1D   but    1,1 1,3 0D D   , and so forth. The resulting matrix is 
therefore: 
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0 1 0
0 0 1
1 0 0
1 0 0
D
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (3.3) 
Finally, the resulting incidence matrix D  is the following: 
 
-1 1 0
0 -1 1
1 -1 0
1 0 -1
D
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (3.4) 
Now assume that 
1T  fires which is represented by [1,0,0,0].F   the resulting 
marking is  4,2,1 .M ₁  however, the same result could be obtained using the state’s 
equation 
0FA M M   illustrated below: 
      
1 1 0
0 1 1
1 0 0 0 5 0 0 4 1 0 .
1 0 1
1 0 1
 
 
   
 
 
 
 (3.5) 
3.2 Use of the Incidence Matrices 
We further illustrate the use of the incidence matrices using the example in 
Figure 3.2, where some arcs have multiplicity larger than 1. 
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P1
P2
P3
T1
T2
T3
2
T4
4
 
Figure 3.2. Petri Net example with 3 places and 4 transitions 
 
The incidence matrices are 
 
1 0 1 0 4 0
0 2 0 0 0 1
, .
0 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0
D D 
   
   
    
   
   
     
And therefore, 
0 4 0 1 0 1 -1 4 -1
0 0 1 0 2 0 0 -2 1
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 -1 0
1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 -1
D D D
     
     
         
     
     
       
 
Transition 
iT  is enabled at a marking M if and only if:   
 ,  1,  2, , .ij jD M p j m    
The marking update equation, often called the state equation for a Petri net, is 
1  ,  1, 2,...
 is the firing vector
T
k k k
k
M M D u k
u
  
 (3.6) 
 23 
In the example above, the initial marking is  
0 [5 0 1]M   and 1T  is enabled because 
   5 0 1 1 0 1 .Using the state equation, one obtain the updated marking 
 
-1 4 -1
0 -2 1
[5 0 1] [1 0 0 0] [4 4 0]
1 -1 0
1 0 -1
M M
 
 
    
 
 
 
 (3.7) 
3.3 Markov Model Representation (MMR) of a Petri Net 
If all transitions in a Petri Net are conservative (the number of tokens in the net 
never increases), or if token-increasing transitions do not occur in a cycle, and the initial 
number of markings is less than a pre-specified number, then there is a finite number of 
possible markings that can be produced by the simulation. Not all the possible markings 
will actually occur, and some may be extremely improbable (in STPN).  A Markov model 
representation can then be found where the nodes are the occurring markings (called the 
states of the Markov chain) and the arcs represents the direct transitions from one 
marking to another. 
A Petri Net example is shown in Figure 3.3 allowing only 3 tokens or less in the 
Petri Net. 
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Figure 3.3. A Petri Net example constructed in Snoopy 
 
It is obvious that the three tokens will be distributed according to transitions. In 
fact, each time a transition is in play a different distribution is reached. Table 3.1 lists all 
the possible markings that can result. 
Table 3.1. The different markings reached in the Petri Net example 
Marking Tokens 
1 [0 0 0 0 0 3] 
2 [0 0 2 0 0 0] 
3 [0 0 0 0 2 1] 
4 [0 1 1 0 0 0] 
5 [0 0 0 2 0 1] 
6 [0 2 0 0 0 0] 
7 [2 0 0 0 0 1] 
 
 
Careful consideration will show that the transition diagram containing the 
different markings can be summarized in Figure 3.4. The number on the arcs denotes the 
transition needed. For example, starting with the marking 
1 [0,0,0,0,0,3]M   and 
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following transition 6 (moving two tokens from 
6P  to 5P ), will lead to marking
3 [0,0,0,0,2,1]M  . Moreover, one can assign a rate i  to transition iT , thus leading to a 
stochastic Petri Net.  The stochastic Petri Net transitions in Figure 3.3 can be then 
represented by a CTMC in Figure 3.4 
 
1 6
3
7 4
3
5
2
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
R
 

 



 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 (3.8) 
  
  
 
Figure 3.4. The Markov Chain representation of the Petri Net in Figure 3.3 
 
A Markov model transition matrix Z  can be defined in terms of the rate matrix as 
follows 
 
0 1
0 0
ij ij
ij ij
R Z
R Z
  
  
 (3.9) 
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The transition on Zero-pattern matrix Z  for Figure 3.4  is: 
 
 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Z
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The reachability captures the system’s ability to get from one marking to another 
in one or more steps. The reachability graph is a digraph that contains all the possible 
markings of Petri Net as nodes. An arrow from node i to node j explained earlier 
indicates that there is a sequence of feasible transitions that allow marking i to reach 
marking j .  
The reachability graph can be represented by the matrix: 
 
 
1 if   ( , ) 0  for some t 0
0  otherwise
t
ij
Z i j
W
  
  
 
 
 It can be shown [31] that the nonzero elements of W are the nonzero elements of: 
2 1.....  with  is the dimention of .nI Z Z Z n Z     Hence one can use the MATLAB 
code: 11 0  (eye(size( , ) )nW Z Z . 
 If a state i  is reachable from state j  and vice versa, then they are said to belong 
to a communicating class. Such a class is the set of all states that communicate with each 
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other or with a class representative. If there are m communicating classes then there are 
m  representative markings: 1,..., mU U . This is summarized in the matrix C  where: 
 
1 if state  is in class  includes
0 otherwise
ij
j i
C
 
  
 
 (3.10) 
 
 For the Markov model in Figure 3.4 there are 4 classes:  
        2,4,6 , 1,3 , 5 ,  and 7  (3.11) 
which can be represented by the list of class representatives: 
 
0 1 0 1 0 1 0
1 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1
U
 
 
 
 
 
   
3.4 Algorithm to Find the MMR for Petri Net Incidence Matrices 
 
The idea behind an algorithm that computes the Markov representation (or state 
transition matrix Z is to count all the states reachable from the initial state
0M in the 
current system in study. We start from an initial state
0M , then we record all the unique 
states obtained by firing enabled transitions. For each new state we repeat the same 
process. This algorithm makes the assumption that the Petri Net is bounded, i.e. the state 
space is finite.  
Figure 3.5  details the steps followed to obtain the transition matrix. At every 
iteration, the algorithm has a current marking list and a list of considered markings
cL . If 
the current marking has not been considered before, it is then considered and appended to
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cL  
after updating the adjacency or transition matrix Z . The algorithm searches for new 
markings by finding enabled transitions. The markings found are appended to the list 
NL
of markings to be considered. Then the algorithm iterates until no new marking is found 
and 
NL  is empty. Arcs are added to the graph when an enabled transition takes marking 
i to marking j . The flow chart in Figure 3.5 offers more details concerning this 
algorithm. 
 
Figure 3.5. Algorithm for the representation of the Petri Net by a Markov model 
 
 The program resulting from the above algorithm works fine with small nets like 
the one shown in Figure 3.3. However; when the net starts to be bigger like the Fault 
model, the program is not efficient in the sense that we got a huge data. In fact, the data 
obtained is 2020 markings in 3hours the time we left the program running. 
 
Start
Get the initial marking Mo and append to New Marking List (NML)
Is the new marking list empty?
Select new marking M
StopNo Yes
Is M identical to 
another existing 
marking?
Append the list of 
existing markings 
with M
No
Is the set of 
enabled 
transitions from 
M empty?
Tag M 
terminal
yes
Append all new 
markings to NML and 
update the adjacency 
listNo
Tag M oldYes
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3.5 Steady-State of the MMR 
 
The rate matrix ,  R is defined in Equation (3.8) and corresponding to Figure 3.3 
is 
 
0 1 6 0 0 0 0 7
0 0 0 3 0 0 0 3
7 0 0 0 4 0 0 11
0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3
0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5
0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   
   
   
   
   
    
   
   
   
   
   
, R E  
Where E(i)=sum(R(i,:))  therefore, from equation  (2.10)  Q  becomes:  
 
7 1 6 0 0 0 0
0 3 0 3 0 0 0
7 0 11 0 4 0 0
.0 0 0 3 0 3 0
0 0 0 0 5 0 5
0 2 0 0 0 2 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
   
 
Since ( ) (0) Qtt e  , the steady state probability can be written as:  
  lim ( ) 0,0.089,0,0.089,0,0.134,0.685 .
t
t 

   
Another way to compute the steady state probability is to simulate the dynamics 
of the CTMC model. In fact, the impulse response of a single-input state-space model can 
be used: 
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 ( ) (0) ( )
( ) ( )
T
T Td Q t u t
dt
y t t
 

 


 

  (3.12) 
 
The above equation is equivalent to the following unforced response with initial state
(0) : 
 ,  and y=
d
Q
dx

   (3.13) 
 
 Figure 3.6 illustrates the history of the state probabilities. Note that the steady state 
probability vector is found to be the same as
 .  
  
   
 
Figure 3.6. State trajectory as an impulse response 
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3.6 Estimating the Probability Transition Matrix from Monte Carlo 
Simulations 
The method in Section finds a Markov model containing all the possible states no 
matter how improbable they are. The method proposed here focuses on the probable 
states and is based on an intuitive understanding of the probability transition matrix. 
Essentially, one can estimate the probability 
ijP  by counting how many times state j  
occurred immediately after i  in a set of simulations or Monte Carlo runs, and then 
dividing by the total number that state i  occurred. The implementation is summarized in 
Figure 3.7.    
We simulate the Petri Net example in Figure 3.3 using Snoopy using a step size 
0.01 for 10000 stepsST  .We used two different methods in order to compute the 
transition matrix P  and the infinitesimal generator Q  from the simulation files.  
 
 
Figure 3.7. Algorithm pseudo-code to compute P and Q 
 
Pseudo code to compute the Q matrix 
Input: data from Snoopy software 
1. Simulate the Petri net for a given number of Monte Carlo runs  
2. Collect the history of the markings and determine the matrix M of the unique rows 
3. Initialize a zero square matrix P that has the same size as the number of rows in M 
4. For each Monte Carlo run collect the marking trajectory in matrix G and do the following: 
4.1 For all m,n find the number of times where a marking n follows the marking m 
immediately. This is achievable using the MATLAB command K =FINDSTR (G’, [m 
n]) 
4.2 Add K  to the corresponding entry in P(m,n) 
5. Normalize every row of P by the sum of the elements on the row 
6. Q=(P-I)/∆   where ∆ is the sampling period and I is the identity matrix 
7. Return P and Q 
 
 32 
 Alternatively, we use MATLAB’s command hmmestimate which computes the 
same probability using a more sophisticated method. The implementation is shown in 
Figure 3.8. 
 
 
Figure 3.8. Alternative algorithm to compute P and Q 
 
 Using the algorithm in Figure 3.7 one obtains the matrices P

 and Q

 using a 
sampling period 0.01ST . The estimated probability transition matrix is: 
  
0.90 0.04 0.039 0.003 0 0 0
0 0.95 0 0.04 0 0 0
0.01 0 0.94 0 0.03 0 0
0 0 0 0.95 0 0.04 0 ,  
0 0 0 0 0.96 0 0.03
0 0.05 0 0 0 0.94 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.99

 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
P  (3.14) 
  
 
 
Alternative Pseudo code to compute the Q matrix 
1. Input: data from Snoopy software  
Given M (labels of distinct markings) 
 Given G
1
, G
2… the collection of marking trajectories for MC run 1,2,…. 
1. For the jth MC run,  j=1,2,… 
1.1 Transform Gj into gi history of labels as named in M 
1.2 Let gi be the ith row of F 
2. [P,O]=hmmestimate(F,F); 
3. Q=(P-I)/∆   where ∆ is the time step and I the identity matrix 
4. Return P and Q 
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And the corresponding semi-infinite generator is 
 
-9.09 4.74 3.95 0.39 0 0 0
0.01 -4.66 0 4.51 0 0.13 0
1.54 0 -5.15 0 3.60 0 0
  0 0.17 0 -4.87 0 4.68 0
0 0 0 0 -3.15 0 3.15
0.01 5.61 0 0.14 0 -5.76 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0

 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Q  (3.15) 
where ( ) / .

  SQ P I T  
The above algorithm tends to shuffle the states. The transition matrix is close to 
the identity matrix. This is explained by the fact that the sampling period 
ST  is quite 
small compared to the transition times. 
Once we have the transition matrix, it is possible to trace back the transition 
diagram by simply drawing an arc from one state to another where the probability of 
transition is greater than zero. As shown in Figure 3.9, the transition diagram the states 
were shuffled compared to the transition diagram in Figure 3.4.  
 
Figure 3.9. Markov Model transition diagram for the Petri Net example 
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3.7 Analysis of Communicating Classes 
Given the zero-pattern matrix Z  of a Markov model, one can compute the 
communicating classes defined in Equation(3.10). Moreover, one can determine the 
class-transition diagram which is a directed tree showing transitions from the so-called 
top strongly-connected components (or classes) of the Markov transition graph to the 
Bottom-Strongly Connected Components (BSCC). A BSCC is a “sink” or “absorbing 
class” and a state entering a BSCC never leaves it. The class transition can be described 
by the class transition matrix H  
 
1 if class  transits to class 
0 otherwise

 

ij
i j
H  (3.16) 
 Note that the matrix H  is similar to the matrix Z , and is a reduced version of it.  
A BSCC is recognized as a class that has no outgoing transitions. This corresponds to a 
zero row in H . The algorithm is shown in Figure 3.10. 
 
 
Figure 3.10. Pseudo-code to compute Communicating classes 
 
The class transition diagram for Figure 3.3 is shown in Figure 3.11. Note that the 
numbering represents classes and not states. 
Communicating classes Pseudo code  
Input: The transition matrix of size n×n 
1. Compute the adjacency matrix (Z=double(p>0)) 
2. Compute the reachability matrix (W=(eye(n) +Z)^(n-1)) 
3. Compute the communicating classes (C= unique(W &W', 'rows')) 
4. Compute the image matrix (H=C*Z*C’) and replace H by H=H& ~eye(size(H,1)) 
5. Eh=(sum(H,2)==0) returns the indices of the BSCCs 
 
 35 
 
Figure 3.11. The Class transition diagram for the petri Net example in Figure 3.3 
 
 
 
 
The following matrix relates class to states: 
 
 
0     0     0     0     0     0     1
0     0     0     0     1     0     0
0     1     0     1     0     1      0
1     0     1     0     0     0      0
C
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (3.17) 
Here 1ijC  if state j  is in communicating class i  and 0 otherwise. 
That is class 1= {state 7}, class 2= {state 5}, class 3= {state 2, state 4, state 6}, and 
finally class 4= {state 1, state 3}. 
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CHAPTER 4    
A HIERARCHICAL FAULT MODEL FOR WMD ATTACKS 
 
 
We limit our research to the three interaction infrastructure systems; namely the 
Information systems, the Transportation systems, and the Health systems.  
4.1 A Hierarchical Model 
The hierarchical model shown in Figure  4.1 illustrates how different systems are 
individually affected by WMD events (e.g. dirty terrorist bomb, nuclear incidents of 
different scales, massive nuclear explosion, high altitude nuclear explosion leading EMP, 
etc.). The second level of this hierarchical model captures WMD effects on the inter-
dependence of different CISs and the propagation of failures among different systems 
subjected to WMD events.  
 
Figure  4.1. A Hierarchical model with first-order and second-order effects 
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The directed graph model shown in Figure 4.2 captures the interdependence 
among CISs. In more details, this also identifies different variables (e.g. Repair needed 
alert, Travel time etc.) We reported in the graph just few variables in order for the graph 
to be more readable. The Inter-Infrastructure Dependence graph focuses on the second 
effect caused by the WMD attack. We are able to identify many variables. For example, 
Traffic management, Worker's transportation, Access to records, Worker's health. Those 
variables are weakened when the WMD attack targeted the corresponding substructure.  
 
Figure 4.2. Inter-Infrastructure dependence graph 
 
4.1.1 The Health Infrastructure Subsystem (HIS) 
The Health Infrastructure Subsystem as shown in Figure 4.3 consists of healthy 
people that get injured, get transported to the hospital, get proper medication, and finally 
become healthy people again. For simplification we considered that dead people are 
going to be replaced by healthy people. Also, we considered Doctors, Ambulances, and 
Nurses resources as invulnerable.  
IIS
TIS HIS
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aff
ic 
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The HIS has 40 people. When one person gets injured, he or she became disabled. 
The disabled person has to wait an exponentially-distributed random time with rate H . 
After an exponentially-distributed random time, he or she will receive medication to 
become healthy again. This process is done indefinitely and it is done for one token at a 
time. This is a simplifying assumption. 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Health Infrastructure Model 
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4.1.2 The Information Infrastructure Sub-system (IIS) 
The Information Infrastructure Subsystem is shown in Figure 4.4. It has many 
working information units. Examples of units which can fail and be repaired are 
computers, instructions, stored facts, and procedures. The transitions in this model are 
stochastic transitions with rates  and F R  .  
 
 
Figure 4.4. Information Infrastructure Model 
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4.1.3 The Transportation Infrastructure Subsystem (TIS) 
The Transportation Infrastructure Subsystem as shown in Figure 4.5  has drivable 
roads that get damaged, get repaired using materials and workers, after which the roads 
become drivable again. In this model, we consider that the shipment transition is always 
enabled and hence the Materials are always available. We also considered that workers 
are always available.  
 
Figure 4.5. The Transportation Infrastructure Model 
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4.2 The Weapon of Mass Destruction Event 
A Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) is assumed to damage all the subsystems 
at the same time. When WMD attack hits the IIS, TIS, and HIS are first affected 
separately. Figure 4.6 shows graphically how the three sub-systems will be affected by a 
WMD attack. This representation ignores the cascading effect that might result because 
of the attack. Note that the place WMD_transition will replace one token with 3. But this 
duplication is a onetime event only, and the Petri Net is bounded. 
 
 
Figure 4.6. WMD Event Model 
 
Table 4.1 lists the software names of the places in the Petri Net used in the simulations, 
explains them, and lists their corresponding initial markings. Working_Units denotes the 
number of working units in the IIS. These could be hubs, routers, etc. The Failed_Units 
 42 
are the information failed units. They could be as before hubs, routers, computers, etc.  
The place Hospitals represents the number of hospitals but here only one hospital is 
considered. Healthy_People represents the number of people available. The other 
variables follow the same logic. 
 
Table 4.1. The different places in the hierarchical fault model (HFM) and their 
explanations 
Place Id Explanation Initial marking  
Failed_Units 1 IIS failed units 0 
Workings_Units 2 IIS working units 5 
WMD 3 The WMD attack 1 
NIS_Destroy 4 The IIS receive the WMD attack 0 
People_Hurt 5 The number of people hurt 0 
Road_Destroy 6 The number of roads destroyed 0 
Ambulances 7 The number of ambulances 
available 
1 
Hospitals 8 Contains the disabled people 0 
Healty_People 9 The number of healthy people 10 
Disabled_People 10 The number of disabled people 0 
Drivable_Roads 11 The number of drivable roads 10 
Broken_Roads 12 The number of broken roads 0 
H_Server_Down 13 Hospital server down 0 
T_Server_Down 14 Transportation server down 0 
Wait_Room 15 The waiting room 0 
T_Grid_Broken 16 Transportation grid broken 0 
T_Grid_Online 17 Transportation grid is online 0 
H_Server_Online 18 The hospital server is online 0 
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Table 4.2 explains the stochastic transitions involved. Those transitions are 
stochastic and follow the exponential distribution.  
Table 4.2. Stochastic transitions and their explanations    
Stochastic 
transition 
Id Explanation Rate average 
time 
between 
transiti
ons 
Input 
places 
(multipl
icity) 
output 
places 
(multipl
icity 
Unit_Repair 1 IIS unit repair 1/(4*7)  4 weeks 9(5),1,1
1 
9(5),2,1
7,18,11 
Unit_Failure 2 IIS unit failure 1/(365*2)  2 years 2 1,13,14 
WMD _Transition 3 Enable the 
WMD attack 
1 1 day 3 4,6,5 
Trans_to_hosp 4 transit disabled 
people to 
Hospital 
1/(1/24)  1 hour 10,11,7 8,11,7 
Injuries 5 people get 
injured 
1/(7*4*6)  6 
months 
9 10 
Medication 6 People get 
medication 
1/(14)  14 days 8 9 
Road_Failure 7 Road not 
drivable 
1/365 1 year 11 12 
Road_Repair 8 Road become 
drivable 
1/(2*4*7)  2 
months 
12,9(5) 11,9(5) 
T_Grid_Repair 9 Transportation 
server get 
repaired 
1/(1/24)  1 hour 16,17 11 
H_Server_Repair 10 Hospital server 
get repaired 
1/(1/24)  1 hour 15,18 8 
T_Grid_Failure 11 2
nd
 effect of 
WMD over TS 
240 6 
minutes 
11,14 16 
TS_failure 12 1
st
 effect of 
WMD over TS 
240 6 
minutes 
6,11 12 
H_Server_Failure 13 2
nd
effect of 
WMD over HS 
240 6 
minutes 
8,13 15 
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Table 4.2  (cont.) 
IS_failure 14 1
st
 effect 
of WMD 
over IS 
240 6 minutes 2,4 1,13,14 
HS_failure 15 1
st
 effect 
of WMD 
over HS 
240 6 minutes 5,9 10 
 
4.3 The overall Model in Snoopy 
Now we have enough information to build the aggregated model shown in Figure 
4.7.   
 
Figure 4.7. Stochastic Petri Net Model for the hierarchical Fault Model  
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CHAPTER 5 
   ANALYSIS USING MONTE CARLO SIMULATIONS 
 
5.1 Monte Carlo simulation description 
Monte Carlo simulation is a problem solving technique that approximates the 
probability of certain outcomes by running multiple simulations. We have performed 100 
Monte Carlo simulations using the Snoopy software, each for 300 days.  The sampling 
period was one hour. 
5.2 The output data from Snoopy software 
Each output from Snoopy is a csv file. Each of the 100 files contains 7202 rows, 
and each row except the header row contain the number of tokens in every place 
(column).  Table 5.1 shows 12 rows extracted from the first simulation file. Table 5.2 
lists the headers of the columns which they represent Time, Failed_Units…etc.  
 
Table 5.1. Sample data (12) from simulation file 1 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
0 0 5 1 0 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 3 2 0 0 4 6 2 5 3 0 0 3 0 0 
2 3 2 0 3 4 0 2 5 0 0 3 3 0 0 
3 3 2 0 3 4 0 2 5 0 0 3 3 0 0 
4 3 2 0 3 4 0 2 5 0 0 3 3 0 0 
5 3 2 0 3 4 0 2 5 0 0 3 3 0 0 
10 3 2 0 3 4 0 2 5 0 0 3 3 0 0 
50 3 2 0 0 7 0 2 5 0 0 3 3 0 0 
100 3 2 0 0 7 0 7 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 
200 0 5 0 0 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 5.1 (cont.) 
250 0 5 0 0 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
300 0 5 0 0 10 0 10 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
 
Table 5.2. The list of the headers in csv files (The places in the STPN) 
   
Time Failed_Units Working_Units 
WMD Hospital Healthy_People 
Disabled_People Drivable_Roads Broken_Roads 
H_Server_Down T_Server_Down Wait_Room 
T_Grid_Broken T_Grid_Online H_Server_Online 
 
5.3 Statistical Analysis of the Monte Carlo Simulation 
5.3.1 The Tokens distribution 
We concentrate our analysis effort on three main places: Working Units, Healthy 
People, and Drivable Roads. The histograms shown in Figure 5.2 suggest that the IIS 
has recovered as well as HIS. However, the TIS do not seem to have recovered. This is 
explained by the fact that roads need a long time to recover. 
 
Figure 5.1 shows the average (over 100 Monte Carlo runs) time history of the 
number of tokens in the places Working_Units, Healthy_People, and Drivable 
_Roads. The top graph is an average over 50 simulations, and the subsequent graphs are 
for 75 and 100 Monte Carlo runs, respectively. Since there is little difference between 
using 75 and 100 simulations, we conclude that 75 Monte Carlo simulations are enough. 
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Figure 5.1. Monte Carlo simulations averaged 
 
Figure 5.2. Token distributions for the main 3 places 
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Next we show the correlation between the numbers of tokens in all the places. 
The images of the resulting 18 18  matrices are shown in Figure 5.3. This Figure shows 
four plots, which correspond to four different simulations. The four plots are quite 
similar. For each plot we observe that the locations of the white squares are almost the 
same. This tells us that there is a strong correlation between the variables of those 
squares. However, a dark square suggest a weak correlation between those variables. 
Figure 5.4 shows the correlation image of the resulting average of all 100 simulation 
files.  
The correlations were computed as follows. Let ( )ix t  represent the number of 
tokens in place i  at time t . Then the data matrix X  has ( )ij i SX x jT  and the correlation 
matrix is computed using the MATLAB’s command corrcoef. 
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Figure 5.3. Images of correlation matrices based on 4 Monte Carlo runs 
 
 
Figure 5.4.  Image of the average correlation matrix 
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5.3.2 The Communicating Classes 
Next, we apply the algorithm shown in Figure 3.7 to obtain the transition matrix P . 
From there we get the Zero-pattern matrix Z  by applying estimate Equation(3.9).  From 
there we obtain the transition graph of the Markov Chain Representation of the 
Hierarchical Fault Model (HFM) using the algorithm shown in Figure 3.10.  Figure 5.5 
shows the resulting representation. 
 
Figure 5.5. Transition graph of the Markov Chain Representation of the HFM 
 
 
 Once the zero-pattern matrix Z   is obtained, one can compute the communicating 
classes by applying the algorithms shown in Figure 3.10.  The result is the reduced graph 
shown in Figure 5.6. This figure shows that class 72 is the only BSCC. The normal 
working condition states (states 35 and 220) are members of class 72. Figure 5.7 is the 
image of P I  matrix. We note from the image that many states have low probability or 
never occur. 
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Figure 5.6. Class representation of the hierarchical fault model 
 
 
Figure 5.7. Image of P-I matrix 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
 We have developed a methodology to capture the interdependency between the 
different subsystems of the critical infrastructure systems using stochastic Petri Nets. The 
modeling combines common sense understanding of what happen while specific data are 
available. 
 We have subsequently developed a methodology that can extract the most 
probable marking from Monte Carlo Simulations of the resulting Petri Net and to obtain a 
far simpler and more Markov model. The one-step transition matrix, the probability 
transition matrix, the reachability graph, the class transition matrix and the BSCC classes 
were successfully obtained using reliable algorithms. Simulations shows that the HFM 
model developed recovers in a reasonable amount of time and that the normal states are 
attracting in the long term.  
In future work, we will extract more information from the infinitesimal generator, 
such as time needed to move from one state to another. Also, future work will compare 
different designs of the network in order to determine which configuration is more robust. 
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